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CHAPTER ___

TREATY SELF-EXECUTION AS
“FOREIGN” FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW?
DUNCAN B. HOLLIS AND
CARLOS M. VÁZQUEZ
In this chapter, we posit that in some cases a state’s approach to a foreign
relations problem may have an external origin, generating what might be called
“foreign”
foreign
relations
law”
(FFRL).
Differentiating
the
exogenous/endogenous origins of foreign relations laws raises questions that can
deepen and develop the nascent field of comparative foreign relations law.1 Why
do states accept (or reject) FFRL? How does FFRL enter a state’s system? Who
is doing the transporting? What happens to FFRL in its new site(s) – i.e., how static
or dynamic does the concept prove in different settings? The answers to these
questions may, in turn, set the table for more normative questions such as when
states should seek (or resist) the importation of foreign relations law.
To illustrate the possibilities of FFRL, this chapter offers a case study of
treaty self-execution. In Part I, we explain the doctrine’s origins and its various
manifestations in the United States and other national legal systems. We highlight
some similarities between the forms the doctrine has taken in the United States and
other states, including indications that the doctrine’s origins and development in
the latter states were influenced by U.S. case-law and scholarship. In Part II, we
introduce three sets of framing questions regarding the identification, causation,
and evolution of FFRL. We conclude by highlighting several practical and
normative implications of FFRL.

I.

SELF-EXECUTION THROUGH A COMPARATIVE LENS

The doctrine distinguishing self-executing from non-self-executing treaties
originated in the United States, and it is fair to say that few doctrines of U.S. foreign
relations law have confounded U.S. courts and commentators as thoroughly.2 It is
1

A similar line of research already exists in many other areas of comparative law. See,
e.g., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anthea Roberts et al. eds., 2018); SUJIT CHOUDHRY, THE
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 16 (2006); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L. J. 1225, 1229 (1999) ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS – AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993). But see Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal
Transplants,’ 4 MASTRICHT J. EURO. & COMP. L. 111 (1997).
2
See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979).
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therefore surprising that this distinction has been embraced in other states. It has,
for example, found its way into the South African Constitution, where scholars have
noted that this “unwise[]” importation from U.S. jurisprudence3 is “bound to create
problems.”4 In some states, the term “direct effect” is used to describe the selfexecution concept, but scholars appear to use the terms interchangeably.5
Commentators have argued that the U.S. term “self-executing” masks a
number of distinct issues that should be addressed separately.6 Some have gone so
far as to claim that “[t]his word ‘self-executing’ is essentially meaningless and the
quicker we drop it from our vocabulary the better for clarity and understanding.”7
Nonetheless, the adoption of the concept—and the term—by other states suggests
that it serves a purpose that courts (and sometimes constitution-writers) regard as
necessary. A comparative look at the doctrine of self-execution of treaties reveals,
moreover, that the term has been as versatile outside the United States as inside it.
The U.S. Doctrine
In U.S. case law, the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties articulates a limit on the judicial power to enforce treaties
notwithstanding a general constitutional rule that treaties have the force of domestic
law. That rule marked a shift from the constitutional law of Great Britain where
treaties have never had the force of domestic law. U.K. courts only apply treaties
if they have been given domestic legal force by statute. The U.S. Constitution, in
contrast, declares that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”8

3

Neville Botha, Treaty Making in South Africa: A Reassessment, 25 SAYIL 69, 91 (2000).
JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 62 (3d ed. 2005).
Other scholars are less concerned. See Elias M. Ngolele, The Content of Self-Execution and Its
Limited Effect in South African Law, 31 SAYIL 141 (2006); M.E. Olivier, Exploring the Doctrine
of Self-Execution as Enforcement Mechanism of International Obligations, 27 SAYIL 99 (2002).
5
See, e.g., Christina Binder & Catherine M. Brölmann, The Law of Treaties Before
Domestic Courts and Human Rights Bodies, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS (A.
Reinisch and R. Janik eds., OUP, forthcoming 2018) (using the term ‘selfexecuting’ interchangeably with ‘directly applicable’ or ‘directly effective’); Andre Nollkaemper,
The Duality of Direct Effect of International Law, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 105, 106 n.3 (2014)
(referencing Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Self-Executing Treaties and the Impact of International Law
on National Legal Systems: A Research Guide, 26 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 56 (1998)).
6
See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM.
J. INT’L L. 695, 695 (1996).
7
See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law (April 27, 1951), 45 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 101, 102 (1951).
8
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
4
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The concept of a non-self-executing treaty first emerged (even though the
Court did not use the term) in Foster v. Nielson.9 In Foster, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that some treaties require legislative implementation before they may
be enforced by the courts despite the Constitution’s declaration that all treaties have
the force of domestic law. As the Court put it in Percheman v. United States, the
paradigmatic non-self-executing treaty is one that “stipulates for a future legislative
act.”10 Thus, if a treaty text says its aims are to be accomplished through subsequent
legislation, then the courts may not enforce it until such legislation is enacted.
After Percheman, the Supreme Court did not address the self-execution
doctrine again in any depth until 2008. In the interim, the Court routinely enforced
treaties without pausing to consider whether they were self-executing. After the
Second World War, U.S. lower courts invigorated the distinction between selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties. 11 But rather than confine the concept to
treaties that expressly “stipulate for” future legislation, the courts inferred the need
for implementing legislation from various factors. The resulting case law has been
aptly described as confounding, and the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Medellín
v. Texas did little to clarify matters.12 U.S. courts have employed the non-selfexecuting concept to describe at least four reasons for why particular treaties might
not be judicially enforceable despite the Constitution assigning them the force of
domestic law.
First, some U.S. cases indicate that a treaty requires implementing
legislation if it purports to accomplish something that, under the U.S. Constitution,
can only be accomplished by statute. Examples include treaties that purport to raise
revenue, make conduct criminal, or appropriate money.13 The Restatement
(Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (hereinafter “Fourth
Restatement”) recognizes this as a distinct category of non-self-executing treaties.14
Second, numerous U.S. cases apply the distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties to distinguish between treaty provisions that give
private parties a cause of action and those that do not.15 The Third and Fourth
Restatements take the position that the existence of a private cause of action is

9

Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). The Court first used the term “selfexecuting” in Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 120 (1887).
10
United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
11
For analysis of these developments, see DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY
SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2016).
12
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). On Medellín, see generally Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of
Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008).
13
For citations, see Vázquez, supra note 6, at 718 & nn.107-09.
14
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
110(3) cmt. f & reporters’ note 11 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)].
15
See Vázquez, supra note 6, at 719-22.
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distinct from the “self-execution” issue.16 For present purposes, however, the
important points are that (a) that U.S. courts have often referred to this as a “selfexecution” issue, and (b) that this issue is conceptually distinct from the others that
the courts use the term “self-executing” to describe.
A third category derives from the cases that originally introduced
the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, i.e., a nonself-executing treaty is one that must be implemented by legislation because it
“stipulates for some future legislative act.” This does not mean that a treaty’s selfexecuting character is a matter of international law rather than U.S. foreign relations
law. Treaties generally do not address the manner in which they are to be enforced
in the courts of states-parties, and it is clear that a treaty’s self-executing character
does not turn on whether the treaty requires direct judicial enforcement as a matter
of international law.17 Still, this domestic law distinction turns on the type of
substantive obligation to which the parties agreed. In the words of Chief Justice
Marshall in Foster, did the parties “pledge the faith” of the nation to accomplish
certain aims through subsequent acts of domestic legislation, or, in his words in
Percheman, did they “stipulate for a future legislative act”? According to the
Fourth Restatement, “[a] treaty provision is more likely to be regarded as selfexecuting if it imposes obligations or creates authorities designed to have
immediate effects, as opposed to contemplating additional legal measures.”18
Finally, U.S. courts have recognized that treaty provisions require
legislative implementation before they may be judicially enforced if they are
framed in vague or aspirational terms. This category also encompasses precatory
terms (i.e., requiring parties to use their “best efforts”). The Fourth Restatement
recognizes that “whether a treaty provision is sufficiently precise or obligatory” is
a “consideration” in determining if it is self-executing, but does not treat this as a
separate category of non-self-execution.19
Vague or aspirational treaty provisions might be unenforceable because
such language suggests that the parties contemplated the provision’s aims would be
fleshed out through subsequent legislation. If so, then thus category might be
regarded as a subset of the self-execution category recognized in Foster and
Percheman (with stipulations for legislation inferred from—rather than expressed
in—treaty text). Alternatively, these cases might reflect separation-of-powers
concerns: to the extent a treaty provision leaves the parties with discretion on its
16

See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 110 cmt. b, § 111, § 111 cmt.
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h.
17

a; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

See Vázquez, supra note 12, at 652-56. Accord RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 110 cmt. c.;
Cf. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 546-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“whether further legislative action is
required before a treaty provision takes domestic effect … is often a matter of how that Nation’s
domestic law regards the provision’s legal status. And that domestic status-determining law differs
markedly from one nation to another”).
19

Id., §110, cmt. d.
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performance, the political branches—not the courts—are best suited to exercise that
discretion. Under this alternative explanation, implementing legislation is
required—not because of the parties’ intentions—but due to constitutional
principles allocating power between U.S. courts and the political branches.
We think the second explanation is more persuasive. Even treaties that
“stipulate for a future legislative act” do not, technically, reflect the parties’
preference that the treaty be unenforceable pending enactment of legislation. Such
language may reflect permission for states-parties not to apply the treaty as
domestic law before further legislation is enacted. But, even treaties phrased in
precise and obligatory terms implicitly permit parties to enforce such provisions in
the courts via implementing legislation. Otherwise, states following the British rule
would not be able to become parties.
Self-Execution Across the Globe
Looking at other states shows that (a) some have specifically imported selfexception in name or concept; (b) each of the foregoing U.S. types of non-selfexecution has an analogue in one or more other states; and (c) virtually all states
recognize some version of the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties. Moreover, even though the term is susceptible to multiple
meanings, most states employing it fail to draw clear distinctions among the
possible grounds of non-self-execution.
Constitutional Non-Self-Execution
Although the British constitutional rule—where treaties may not be
judicially enforced absent implementing legislation—pre-dates the U.S. selfexecution concept, courts and commentators outside the United States commonly
use the term “non-self-executing” to describe the status of treaties in states that
follow the British rule. Thus, “according to the government of India, treaties are
not self-executing and therefore ‘require enabling legislation, or constitutional and
legal amendments in cases where existing provisions of law and the Constitution
are not in consonance with the obligations arising from the treaty.’”20 In such strict
dualist states therefore, the rule reflects the idea that treaties are concluded by the
Executive, while enactment of domestic law is a matter for the legislature.21
For these States, the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties describes a general attribute of treaties under their domestic law.
20

Nihal Jayawickrama, India, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 326, 341-369 (David Sloss ed., 2009).
21
Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario, [1937] AC 326 (PC) [347]
(appeal taken from Can.). See generally CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 31, 81
(2014). Although these states can be described as “strict dualist” states with respect to treaties, we
note that these same states are monist with respect to customary international law, which they regard
as part of the law of the land without the need for legislative implementation.
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The terms are not used to distinguish some treaty provisions from others, as they
are in states where treaties generally have direct effect as domestic law. As noted,
the U.S. Constitution gives “all” treaties the force of domestic law. And, in the
Netherlands—where the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties has also taken root22—treaties have a higher status in the domestic legal
order than other forms of domestic law.23 In states like the United States and the
Netherlands, therefore, a treaty’s “non-self-executing” character does not relate to
its status as domestic law, but rather describes a treaty that—while having the force
of domestic law—is not directly applicable in the courts (either in all cases or in a
given case).
As noted, one type of U.S. non-self-executing treaty purports to accomplish
what, under the U.S. Constitution, may only be done by the legislature. The need
to enact legislation to implement such treaties results from the Constitution itself,
which disables the treaty-makers from accomplishing certain things directly. In
light of the constitutional disability, treaties falling within this category of non-selfexecution might be thought to lack domestic legal force by virtue of the
Constitution itself. Treaties in states that follow the British rule are “non-selfexecuting” in exactly this sense. The difference is that, in the United States, this
category includes very few treaties, whereas in states following the British rule, this
category includes all treaties.
South Africa presents a hybrid situation. It has departed from the British
rule, but its constitution appears to provide that all non-self-executing treaties lack
domestic legal force. Section 231(2) provides that some treaties “bind[] the
Republic only after [they have] been approved by resolution in both the National
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces.”24 Section 231(4) goes on to
provide that “a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by
Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or
an Act of Parliament.”25 A non-self-executing provision therefore does not have the
force of domestic law (i.e., is not “law within the Republic”). South Africa thus
employs the concept of self-execution to describe an attribute that some treaties
possess and others lack, like the United States and the Netherlands but unlike strict
dualist states (which use non-self-execution to describe all treaties in their legal
systems). Unlike the United States and the Netherlands, however, the non-selfexecuting character of South African treaties always deprives them of domestic
legal force.
Interestingly, states that do give treaties the force of domestic law have not
followed the U.S. example of considering some treaties non-self-executing on the
22
See Jan G. Brouwer, The Netherlands, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 502505 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005).
23
See id. at 498 (“the priority of treaty law over municipal law has never been seriously
contested in the Dutch legal literature.”).
24
S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 231(2).
25
Id. § 231(4).
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ground that they purport to accomplish something that, under their constitutions,
may only be accomplished by law-makers. This is likely because these states
generally require legislative consent before a treaty’s ratification, and thus the
treaty-makers and the law-makers are the same entities.26 Even in these states,
however, the particular type of treaty obligation involved may, for constitutional
reasons, impose additional constraints on the treaty provision’s self-executing
nature. For example, treaties that contemplate the criminalization of conduct will,
in most states, require additional levels of specificity and clarity.27
Non-Constitutional Non-Self-Execution
In states that generally give domestic legal force to treaties, the term “nonself-executing” (and its cognate “no direct effect”) describe an attribute of certain
treaties, describing treaties that are not judicially enforceable in the absence of
implementing legislation even though treaties generally have the force of domestic
law. In some states, the distinction has its basis in explicit constitutional text. Thus,
in the Netherlands, a constitutional amendment in 1956 clarified that “the power of
courts [was] restricted to treaties that are self-executing.”28 The constitution
provided that “[s]tatutory regulations . . . [may not be applied] . . . if such
application is in conflict with [treaty] provisions . . . that are binding on all
persons.”29 The reference to treaties that are “binding on all persons” is generally
understood to establish that the judicial power is limited to enforcing treaties that
are self-executing.30 In most states that generally give treaties domestic legal force,
however, courts have elaborated a similar distinction without constitutional text.
Courts applying the self-executing/non-self-executing distinction in these
states appear to use it for issues similar to those addressed by the U.S. doctrine.
One notable difference, however, is that non-U.S. courts rarely say that a treaty’s
self-executing character is a matter of intent.31 This could be because these courts
recognize that treaties rarely—if ever—address whether they are to be enforced
directly by courts or through implementing legislation. Indeed, recognition of this
fact may explain why the Fourth Restatement takes the position that self-execution
turns on the U.S. treaty-makers’ intent or understanding rather than the intent of all

26

See Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law & Practice, in NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 36, 41.
27
See, e.g., André Nollkaemper, The Netherlands, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN
TREATY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 20, at 357-58; Lech Garlicki et al., Poland, in THE ROLE OF
DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 20, at 370, 403.
28
Brouwer, supra note 22, at 502-03.
29
Id. at 503 (quoting The Netherlands’ Constitution, art. 94).
30
Id. (citing Kemerstukken II, 1955-1956 4133 (R 19), No. 3, 5) (“The term ‘self-executing
treaty provision’ was considered to be a synonym [for the constitutional language].”).
31
There are isolated exceptions, however. See Nollkaemper, The Netherlands, supra note
27, at 341 (citing Supreme Court, E.O. v. Public Prosecutor, 18 April 1995, 28 N.Y.I.L. 1997, 336).

7

parties.32 In contrast, courts and commentators in other states have not taken the
position that the self-executing nature of treaties turns on either the parties’ intent
or the unilateral intent of a given country’s treaty-makers.
On the other hand, several non-U.S. courts echo the U.S. category of using
self-execution to assess “whether the provision was designed to have immediate
effect, as opposed to contemplating additional measures by the [legislature].”33 The
Supreme Court of Poland, for example, has written that treaty provisions may be
“‘qualified as self-executing’” when they “‘creat[e] immediate entitlements for
citizens.’”34 It has also found a treaty provision to be non-self-executing because
“[t]he wording of that provision indicates that it was directly addressed only to the
State, establishing its obligation to adopt a corresponding penal norm.”35
Like U.S. courts, other states’ courts sometimes use self-execution to refer
to treaties that confer remedies on private parties. Thus, the Supreme Court of
Poland has stated that “international agreement provisions are effective not only
with regard to the States, but may provide an independent ground of claims for
damages raised before domestic courts (so-called self-executing norms).”36
By far the most common approach to self-execution for states that generally
give treaties the force of domestic law is to regard treaties as self-executing when
they are framed in sufficiently precise and obligatory terms for judicial application.
Belgian legal scholar Marc Bossuyt describes this as the requirement that the treaty
be “self-sufficient.”37 Judicial decisions from numerous states reflect this theme.
Thus, Brouwer concludes that, “[e]xamining the [Netherlands Supreme] Court’s
case law, one may say that [a treaty will be deemed non-self-executing] if there is
a lack of judicially manageable standards for resolving the question, or when the
issue involved ought to be resolved by the legislator.”38 The Supreme Court of
Poland has held that whether “a treaty may be regarded as self-executing” turns on
32

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 110 cmt. c (“[T]reaties . . . typically do not address the issue
of domestic implementation.”); id. § 110 (2) (“Courts will evaluate whether the text and context of
the provision are consistent with an understanding by the U.S. treatymakers that the provision would
be directly enforceable in U.S. courts.”). For a critique of the Restatement’s emphasis on U.S.
treaty-maker’s intent, see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Four Problems with the Draft Restatement’s
Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L. Rev. 1747, 1761 (2015).
33
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 110(2).
34
Garlicki et al., supra note 27, at 370, 402 (quoting I KZP 37/96, OSNKW 1997 nr 3-4,
item 21). The court also suggested the provision must be “apt to be applied by the State bodies,
especially by the courts and administrative organs,” an apparent reference to the requirement,
discussed below, that treaties be sufficiently precise and obligatory. Id.
35
Id. at 403 (quoting V KKN 353/00, Lex 56863).
36
Id. at 402 (quoting I CK 323/02, OSNC 2004 nr 6, item 103).
37
See MARC BOSSUYT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION: BALANCED,
CRITICAL, REALISTIC 104 (2016).
38
Brouwer, supra note 22, at 504-05; Nollkaemper, The Netherlands, supra note 27, at 341
(reading the Dutch cases to establish that “a [treaty] provision can be applied [by the courts] only if
it sufficiently clear from its content that it can serve as objective law”).
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“the completeness of the treaty provision that enables its operation without any
additional implementation [in domestic legislation].”39
The Hungarian
Constitutional Court has stated that “[t]he precondition for applicability [of a treaty
in domestic courts] is that those subject to the international treaty are precisely
defined private entities and that the rights and obligations included in the treaty are
specific enough so that the treaty is enforceable without any further domestic
legislative action.”40 And the Swiss Federal Supreme Court held a treaty (the
Lisbon Treaty) was “not self-executing,” while noting that “[a]ccording to the
relevant case law, a treaty norm is directly applicable if its content is sufficiently
precise and clear to form the basis of a decision in a particular case.”41 In other
words, “[t]he norm . . . has to be justiciable . . .”42
These cases do not explain the rationale for why insufficiently precise treaty
provisions require legislative implementation. Bossuyt takes the position that a
treaty’s self-sufficient status “is a matter of international law.”43 The better vview,
we think, is that sufficiency issues are a matter of domestic—rather than
international—law. A provision that may be too vague to be directly enforced in
the courts of one state may well be enforceable in another. In a number of Latin
American states, for example, there is a “constitutional block” – i.e., specific human
rights treaties designated for direct effect by the constitution or a constitutional
court.44 For example, Article 75 of the Argentine Constitution lists treaties—
including the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights—as having a
constitutional footing.45 As a result, the Argentine Supreme National Court has
found provisions of the Covenant to be enforceable in Argentine courts.46 In
contrast, other states like Switzerland view the same treaty’s provisions as non-selfexecuting.47 In our view, neither the Argentine nor Swiss approach violates the
39

Garlicki et al., supra note 27, at 402 (quoting I CK 323/02, OSNC 2004 nr 6, item 103).
See also id. at 401-02 (noting that treaties are self-executing if they are “apt to be applied by the
State bodies, especially by the courts and administrative organs”).
40
Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Mar. 29, 2005, 964/A/2004, Decision
No. 7/2005 (III. 31) (Hung.). [Preventive Review of Unconstitutionality of Statute, Determination
of Unconstitutional Omission to Legislate].
41
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 13, 2014, 2C_457/2013 (Switz.).
[X v. University of Lucerne, Student Administration Office and Department of Education and
Culture of the Canton of Lucerne].
42
Id.; see also Liechtenstein, Addendum, Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/14/Add.1 ¶24 (28 May 2013).
43
BOSSUYT, supra note 37, at 105.
44
See Rene Urueña, Domestic Application of International Law in Latin America, Chapter
X, infra.
45
Constitution of Argentina 1853 (reinst. 1983, rev. 1994), art. 75(22), English Trans. at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994?lang=en.
46
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
24/04/2012, “SYQC v. Government of the City of Buenos Aires/review of facts motion before the
Supreme Court,” (Arg.).
47
Cf. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 22, 2000, 2P.273/1999
(Switz.)[A and B v. Government of the Canton of Zurich].
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requirements of the Covenant. If the treaty is consistent with a constitutional rule
requiring implementing legislation in all circumstances, then it must also be
consistent with an approach requiring implementing legislation because a state
regards the treaty as too vague for direct judicial enforcement.
Nollkaemper offers a different rationale for the unenforceability of treaty
provisions that are insufficiently clear or specific:
The principal basis for the requirement that the content of a treaty provision
must be clear for it to have direct effect lies in the boundaries of judicial
competence. If a court were to enforce a treaty provision that is formulated
too openly, it would effectively be taking over the task of the legislature.48

This rationale seems to us to accord more closely to the language of the non-U.S.
cases. And, as discussed above, it also may be the best explanation for the judicial
unenforceability of vague/aspirational treaty provisions in U.S. courts. Indeed, the
Dutch cases specifically invoke the absence of “judicially manageable standards”
as the reason for finding a treaty provision non-self-executing, while the Swiss
courts invoke the concept of justiciability. The phrase “judicially manageable
standards” comes directly from Baker v. Carr,49 the leading case in the United
States for the political question doctrine, which is a key justiciability doctrine. As
one of us has argued, the notion that vague or aspirational treaty provisions are nonself-executing is best understood as the treaty-law equivalent of the political
question doctrine.50 Thus, these references to judicially manageable standards and
justiciability are suggestive of the U.S roots of the “self-execution” doctrine in at
least some states. 51

II. SELF-EXECUTION AS “FOREIGN” FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW?
It is not surprising that the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties first emerged in the United States. The United States was the
first country to adopt a Constitution giving treaties automatic force as domestic
law.52 Its courts were thus among the first to determine whether that designation
required judicial enforcement of all treaties, or, instead, permitted a judicial
doctrine limiting enforcement to specific types of treaties.

48

Nollkaemper, The Netherlands, supra note 27, at 342.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is…a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it.”).
50
Vázquez, supra note 6, at 715-16.
51
Like self-execution, moreover, the migration of the political question doctrine across
legal systems could itself be another example of FFRL.
52
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 277 (1796) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (U.S.
Constitution “affords the first instance of any government . . . saying, treaties should be the supreme
law of the land.” (emphasis in original)).
49
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But how did other states come to self-execution? Did they import the term
(and the underlying concept) from the U.S. legal system? This is the central
question that motivates our inquiry into “foreign” foreign relations law (FFRL).
Time and space make a definitive response difficult, but we offer here three framing
questions on the (a) identification; (b) causation; and (c) evolution of self-execution
as FFRL. We believe that these questions may be generalized across comparative
foreign relations law to improve our descriptive (and perhaps normative)
understanding of the field.
Identification – What Constitutes FFRL?
First, the concept of FFRL involves identification—asking if a particular
term (or rule, or allocation of authority) in foreign relations law has external origins.
In some cases, that lineage is clear. As noted, South Africa’s Constitution explicitly
references “self-executing treaties,” and Botha notes that it “was taken over . . .
from United States’ jurisprudence.”53 In other cases identifying FFRLs will not be
so easy. One problem lies in identifying what is being imported – is it just
terminology, functions, or both? The British rule, for example, pre-dates the selfexecution concept. Thus, the use of “non-self-executing treaties” in that context
was—at least initially—the mere importation of the term; it did not include the
original distinguishing function that motivated self-execution’s creation.
Identification may also be problematic in cases of functional convergence,
where states use different terminology. One might find that the evidence supports
reading such cases as FFRL, or, there may be instances where states, facing similar
issues, reached the same solution independently. For example, even if the
Netherlands’ category of treaties with “direct effect” functions akin to selfexecuting treaties, further research is required to determine what—if any—role the
U.S. doctrine of self-execution had in motivating the 1956 constitutional
amendment that introduced that category.
Our comparative analysis of self-execution suggests, moreover, that FFRL
may occur not just in whole, but also in part – some states appear to be adopting
one particular thread of the U.S. self-execution concept without adopting all of
them. Thus, Poland and Hungary have incorporated non-self-executing treaties
involving vague or precatory terms without importing the idea of non-selfexecution based on party intent or constitutional delegation to other branches of the
government.
FFRL may even be pluralist. The South African Constitution, for example,
was subject to multiple foreign influences, including from the U.S., Canada, and
Europe.54 It is possible that the introduction of self-executing treaties owed its
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origin not just to the U.S. jurisprudence, as Botha suggests, but also to European
conceptions of self-executing treaties. Indeed, Michèle E. Olivier (who participated
in drafting South Africa’s earlier, Interim Constitution) suggests the current
constitutional reference should be understood not only in light of U.S. doctrine, but
also of E.U. experiences with self-execution.55 In other words, FFRL might be
constructed from multiple foreign sources rather than just one.56
This last point is worth emphasizing. Although self-execution’s origins
may trace back to the United States, not all instances of FFRL will do so. For
example, domestic authority to forego legislative approval of “executive
agreements” has long been associated with U.S. foreign relations law.57 But it also
appears in other states. It is not clear if modern iterations of executive agreements
derived from the U.S. experience or sprung up elsewhere out of functional necessity
or expediency.58 In other instances, U.S. foreign relations law concepts (e.g., the
practice of concluding treaties among government agencies or ministries) appeared
alongside similar practices elsewhere with no established time-line as to which
state(s) originated the concept.59 There are, of course, numerous examples where
FFRL is not associated with U.S. foreign relations law. For example, the British
practice of concluding legally non-binding memorandum of understanding (MOUs)
has been adopted in numerous other states, including many outside the
Commonwealth.60
How then can we identify FFRL? More research could certainly do so,
although it may be challenging. Differing languages will pose problems. Most
states that give treaties domestic legal force are not English-speaking (most
English-speaking states follow the British rule). Still, if foreign states’ courts cite
U.S. cases on self-execution, that would attribute to its domestic incarnation the
character of FFRL. Of course, certain foreign legal systems (e.g., those that track
55
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the civil law) often cite sources less frequently than common law opinions. In such
cases, references to “foreign” foreign relations scholarship by legislators,
government officials, or scholars may provide an alternative vehicle for identifying
FFRL.61
Nor is FFRL work limited to tracing the path of ideas; the movement of
people (e.g., graduate study in U.S. law schools by foreign decision-makers) could
assign FFRL status to a rule.62 In some cases, historical and cultural materials may
identify FFRL patterns. For example, the shared history of France and Mexico
could explain why both States authorize the conclusion of inter-institutional
agreements (or what the French arrangements administratifs) that—unlike almost
all other states—are viewed as only binding on the concluding agency and not the
state as a whole.63 More rigorous methods for investigating FFRL would engage
in process tracing or elite-level interviews.64
Identification studies might even include a search for cases of FFRL failure.
We predict that sometimes research will reveal de minimis foreign influence on a
state’s foreign relations law. In other cases, a state’s legal system may reject an
invitation to adopt FFRL. In 2017, for example, the Supreme Court of Ghana was
invited to adopt the U.S. concept of executive agreements to legitimate a bilateral
treaty with the United States resettling two detainees from the Guantanamo naval
base. The Court refused to endorse the executive agreements category, holding
instead that all Ghanaian treaties require parliamentary approval. As a result, the
Court ruled that the treaty was unconstitutional.65
Causation – Why do States Import Self-Execution?
61
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Assuming that we can identify self-execution or other examples as FFRL,
the next question is what caused the State to import it? Why do states incorporate
foreign rules, doctrines, or allocations of authority within their foreign relations
laws? We envision at least four possible causes for FFRL: (i) function; (ii)
bricolage; (iii) power; and (iv) socialization.
First, FFRLs may arise due to their functional appeal. With globalization,
states increasingly must mediate the relationship between their internal law and
international legal obligations. In doing so, they encounter new issues for which
their internal law has yet to offer an answer. In such cases, the state’s decisionmakers may survey solutions elsewhere and find one (or more) they believe will
work best for their situation. Our survey above suggests that, in many states, the
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties covers a wide
range of reasons for why a treaty is not subject to judicial application. The attraction
to judges of having discretion to enforce a treaty (or not) is one plausible
explanation for the spread of the amorphous doctrine of self-execution among states
that have (or, like South Africa, have shifted to) a system in which treaties have the
status of domestic law.66
Second, FFRL may be the product of what Mark Tushnet identifies as
bricolage.67 Bricolage would explain the advent of FFRL as the result of
happenstance rather than carefully calibrated functional analysis, where decisionmakers simply adopt concepts about which they have some awareness. To the
extent the United States has the most robust (and certainly most written about)
foreign relations law, its concepts may be the most likely candidates for FFRL.68
Thus, an alternative explanation for self-execution’s global diffusion may be its
visibility rather than its utility. Bricolage may explain why states adopted the
terminology of self-execution rather than one or more of the four (more coherent)
threads it contains.
Power offers a third—and very different—rationale for the existence of
FFRL. Power can manifest itself in various efforts to impose FFRL on a targeted
state. In some cases, international institutions might mandate the direct application
of treaties. Thus, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has held that certain treaty
provisions and acts of EU institutions have “direct effect” in member states’ legal
66
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orders.69 And the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) insists that
member states directly apply the American Convention on Human Rights—and the
Court’s interpretation of it—within their internal legal orders.70 In other cases,
power dynamics might be internal to the state—the result of interactions among
executives, courts, and legislatures.
Power dynamics may also be less formal, resulting from spheres of
influence or the long tail of colonialism. That Commonwealth states follow the
“British rule” is a function of those states’ historical relationship with the United
Kingdom.71 A similar rationale could explain the use of MOUs among
Commonwealth states. But, power also has limits; states can reject the attempted
imposition of a rule. For example, states outside the British sphere (most notably
the United States) have not adopted the linguistic cues or architectural artifacts of
MOUs in concluding political commitments.72 We have our doubts, moreover, that
the spread of the self-execution doctrine resulted from power dynamics; we would
need to see further evidence of U.S. interests favoring the bifurcation of other
states’ judicial enforcement of treaties.
Fourth, forces of socialization may motivate the creation of FFRL. Some
FFRL is likely the result of mimicry. Social scientists have long known that states
sometimes conform their systems to those of other states who they perceive as
successful. The calculation can be instrumental (i.e., “we’ll do what they do to get
where they are”) or affective (i.e., “to be regarded as responsible, we should do this
too”).73 Under this view, self-execution might be adopted—as a term or concept—
to mimic the U.S. doctrine.
Alternatively, FFRL may emerge for expressive purposes. A state might
adopt a regime not because of its functions, but because of what it signals to other
states about the nation and its identity.74 For example, South Africa may have
adopted the concept of self-executing treaties as much to signal its commitment to
human rights and their enforcement as to making functional distinctions among
treaties based such factors as precision.75 Rene Urueña’s chapter in this volume
provides another example, examining how Latin American states may forgo the
69
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very concept of foreign relations law because it is alien to their understanding of
international law as something not outside, but inside, their internal law.76
These four causes should not be understood as exhaustive. Nor do we mean
to suggest they will arise in isolation; FFRL may have not one, but perhaps
multiple, causes. The spread of self-execution, for example, may be explained in
functional terms and as the product of mimicry or bricolage. Other FFRLs might
result from different menus of causal factors.
Moreover, FFRLs could conceivably have different causes at different
times. Self-execution might have originally spread for reasons of bricolage or
mimicry. But it might be sustained within a system for functional reasons whether
in terms of judicial discretion or separation of powers.77 Similarly, the use of nonbinding MOUs might have been originally imposed by a metropolitan power, but
other causes (perhaps the functional utility of coordinating non-binding
commitments around a common format) may explain their subsequent spread
beyond the Commonwealth.
Evolution – How Does FFRL Evolve Over Time?
Even after identifying FFRL and examining why it occurs, the story of its
evolution remains. To begin, we should compare the similarities and differences of
the FFRL to its original source. While self-execution in some states appears to
track some of the features of the U.S. doctrine, some states do not appear to have
adopted all the concepts subsumed under the U.S. self-executing heading.
Differences in form may also prove significant. Consider, for example, selfexecution’s shift in South Africa and the Netherlands from a judicially-developed
doctrine to one specified in constitutional text. Doing so may affect the doctrine’s
status within the domestic legal order and, more importantly, trigger a different set
of interpretative methodologies—i.e., those applicable to constitutions rather than
judicial opinions.
Beyond comparing FFRL manifestations, we should also ask about their
dynamic character. Does FFRL hew to its original boundaries or change over time?
In the context of self-execution, the appeal to judges of the U.S. doctrine’s
malleability—evidenced by its amalgamation of a variety of distinct reasons why a
treaty might not be judicially enforceable—suggest that it is unlikely to evolve (at
least overtly) to any great extent. On the other hand, frustration among judges and
scholars with the doctrine’s indeterminacy may produce pressures for clarification.
Then there is the question of how the FFRL affects the state’s foreign
relations law more generally. Following the British rule, for example, implicates a
76
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whole set of rules and allocations of authority (e.g., the plenary power of the
executive in treaty-making). Similarly, as we have explained, self-execution
implicates not only how international legal obligations enter the domestic legal
system, but it also has broader implications for the separation of powers between a
state’s judiciary and legislature.
One might even ask about the impact of FFRL outside of the state in which
it emerges. As FFRL evolves, it might become a source on which other states rely.
To the extent that one instance of FFRL creates another, FFRL can operate as much
as the influencer as the influenced. Indeed, it might even be possible for certain
strains of FFRL to create a feed-back loop influencing the evolution of the original
rule or regime. To date, self-execution has not exhibited such a pattern – for the
most part, U.S. self-execution doctrine still looks only to U.S. precedents. But there
may be much for U.S. courts and scholars to learn from how this (possibly)
transplanted doctrine has fared abroad. More generally, the experience of other
states with FFRL might cause the originating state to rethink its own foreign
relations law.

III. CONCLUSION
In 1829, the U.S. Supreme Court introduced the idea that, despite the
constitution designating all U.S. treaties the “law of the land,” U.S. courts would
only enforce those treaties labeled as “self-executing.”78 In the 20th century, this
distinction evolved to identify different types of unenforceable U.S. treaties.
Today, this concept of self-execution and the various doctrines it contains are no
longer a uniquely U.S. feature (or as some suggest, a bug) of its foreign relations
law. Various manifestations of self-execution—either in name, function, or both—
are visible in other states’ internal legal systems.
In at least some of these cases, we find indications that states have derived
their version of self-execution from U.S. jurisprudence (i.e., as FFRL). This
chapter offered an introduction to the FFRL concept and suggested ways to
examine it along three different lines of inquiry. First, we suggest that there is value
merely in identifying those parts of a state’s foreign relations law that have external
origins (whether in whole or in part, and whether from single or multiple sources),
including cases where a state rejects proposed FFRLs. Second, we ask what causes
FFRLs, and offer four potential rationales: function, bricolage, power, and
socialization. Third, and finally, we inquire into how FFRL converges or diverges
from its source initially and over time, while evaluating FFRL’s potential impact
on the state’s and other states’ foreign relations law.
But why engage in this approach? What value can our inquiry have?
Comparative law projects are usually celebrated for enhancing intellectual
knowledge and improving self-reflection by increasing knowledge of other
78
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systems. 79 Both goals are served by FFRL. Appreciating that foreign relations
law’s origins lie not only in a state’s history and internal dynamics inevitably
increases our understanding of what law “is” and how it changes. Moreover, for
scholars of foreign relations law, looking at how these concepts travel creates new
opportunities to evaluate the system within which they reside. Some U.S. scholars
have found the self-execution doctrine to be confusing if not incoherent. By
looking at how other states engage with self-execution, U.S. foreign relations
lawyers can gain a new appreciation not only of specific categories of selfexecution, but their functional utility (especially when compared to foreign
variations).
Understanding FFRL may also assist in mapping convergence and
divergence across national systems. Our research suggests that—as a matter of
national law—most states judicially enforce some—but not all—of their treaties.
The more states come to accept this reality, the more they may be sensitized to (or
perhaps even accepting of) another state court’s reticence in empowering its courts
to enforce particular types of treaty provisions without additional guidance from
the legislature. Conversely, where we see states rejecting FFRL, it may signal areas
at risk for future tensions or conflict. Rejecting the idea of executive agreements
in Ghana, for example, threatened the underlying agreement’s validity and the goals
motivating that deal. The U.S. refusal to import the Commonwealth MOU practice
produced some significant disputes over the legal status of certain defense MOUs
it concluded with those states.80
FFRL may even have normative value. Certain rationales for adopting
FFRL have greater normative purchase than others. Functionally motivated FFRLs
may be desirable, while FFRLs that result from power dynamics, especially those
with a colonial heritage, are more undesirable. In other words, a better
understanding of FFRL may allow states to be more conscious in their choices of
whether and when to import/export foreign relations laws.
Finally, FFRL may improve the normative appeal of comparative foreign
relations law itself. At present, the field risks U.S. exceptionalism—not in the
sense of distinguishing foreign relations law from other rules for internal law—but
in pushing states to conceptualize their internal law along U.S. lines.81 Our inquiry
offers a more transparent approach to understanding where ideas and approaches
originate and how they move across boundaries. In doing so, it offers the promise
of a truly global field rather than one indexed to U.S. versions of ideas like selfexecution.
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